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U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 16:

Settling Disputes in the GATT:
The Past, Present, and Future
The marathon Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations are entering their
last, most perilous stretch in Geneva. Trade negotiators from the nearly 100
member nations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) must try
to clear the impasses that remain in the talks, the eighth round of negotiations
since the GATT's founding in 1947. Their reach is unprecedentedly ambitiousnot only to improve the rules of the GATT for trade in products, but also to
establish clear and workable rules for trade in services, investment, and the
protection of intellectual property rights.
The real test of any new rules will be in their trial by dispute settlement
proceedings. No matter how carefully and precisely negotiated, the rules will
engender disputes about their application to particular facts. Expeditious,
effective, and fair procedures are essential to resolve such disputes satisfactorily,
or the rules lose much of their value.
This article outlines the GATT dispute settlement process, describes what
Uruguay Round negotiators have already agreed to, and assesses the prospects

*Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C. Mrs. Bello formerly served as the General Counsel to the
U.S. Trade Representative.
**Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C. Mr. Holmer formerly served as Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative and General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative.
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for agreement on further dispute settlement issues. In addition, it highlights
recent significant decisions by GATT pahels and assesses the significance of
these unfolding developments.
I. GATT Dispute Settlement Prior to the Uruguay Round
The heart of GATT dispute settlement procedures lies in articles XXII and
XXIII of the GATT. Article XXII: 1 requires a Contracting Party at the request
of any other Contracting Party, to consult and to afford "sympathetic consideration" to representations regarding any matter affecting the operation of the
GATT. If consultations under article XXII:I do not result in a satisfactory
solution, article XXII:2 permits a Contracting Party to consult with any other
Contracting Party or Parties regarding the matter concerned.
Article XXIII:I authorizes a Contracting Party to make written representations or proposals to another Contracting Party or Parties whenever it feels that:
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement
is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under
this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation ... 2
Article XXIlI:I essentially provides another more formalized opportunity for
consultations about the broadest possible range of matters affecting the operation
of the GATT. It is specifically not limited to complaints about violations of the
Agreement. Rather, it expressly applies "whether or not" actions are in conflict
with GATT provisions, to the "existence of any . . . situation" that results in the
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the GATT, or in the
establishment of an impediment to the attainment of any GATT objective.
Article XXIlI:2 provides for referral of such disputes to the Contracting
Parties, but only if consultations under article XXIII:I do not result in a
satisfactory solution to the problem. In response to such a referral, the
Contracting Parties must investigate promptly and make "appropriate recommendations" or "give a ruling" on the matter, "as appropriate." In sufficiently
serious circumstances, the Contracting Parties may authorize the aggrieved
Contracting Party or Parties to "suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as

1.GATT T.I.A.S. No. 1700. For an excellent, detailed description of GAIT dispute settlement
procedures, see Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GAIT Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J.
INT'L ARB. 53 (Dec. 1987).
2. GATT, supra note 1,art. XXIII:I.
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they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. ' 3 In other words, failure
to implement the recommendations of the GATT Council (the body through
which the Contracting Parties function) or to take actions in conformity with a
GATT Council ruling may lead to GATT authorization for proportional countermeasures (in common parlance, retaliation). 4 Any Contracting Party against
whom such countermeasures are taken is permitted for sixty days to give notice
of its intention to withdraw from the GATT, which takes effect
on the sixtieth day
5
following receipt of the notice by the GATT Secretariat.
Article XXIII does not refer to the means by which the GATT Contracting
Parties, acting through the Council, make recommendations or give a ruling. The
custom is to use panels to assist the GATT Council in fulfilling its investigative
and quasi-judicial responsibilities under article XXIII. 6 These panel practices
were codified in the Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations in 1979 in the
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance (the Understanding). 7
The Understanding first elaborates on the procedures for consultations. The
Contracting Parties undertake to attempt to conclude consultations expeditiously,
"with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory conclusions." 8 Any party
requesting consultations must state the reasons for that request. Contracting
Parties are required to give special attention to the particular problems and
interests of less developed countries and exhaust the consultative procedures of
article XXIII:I before resorting to article XXIII:2. 9
Most notably, the Understanding explicates and reaffirms the panel procedures
and practices that evolved after the conclusion of articles XXII and XXIII. It
stresses that use of article XXIII:2 dispute settlement procedures is not a
"contentious act," and that all Contracting Parties engaged in such procedures
must act "in good faith in an effort to resolve the disputes."' ° It prohibits the
linking of complaints and countercomplaints in regard to distinct matters."
Next, it requires the Contracting Parties to "decide on" the establishment of
a panel (or working party 12) when so requested by a Contracting Party under
3. Id. art. XXIII:2.
4.

See generally E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEA-

SURES (1984).

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Plank, supra note 1, at 54.
GATT Doc. No. L/4907 (adopted Nov. 28, 1979, as part of the Framework Agreement).
Id. para. 4.
Id. paras. 4-6.
Id. para. 9.

11.

Id.

12. In the 1960s, Contracting Parties often used working parties rather than panels in matters of
widespread interest and application. For example, when the European Community was enlarged from
the original six member states to nine as the result of the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom, the GATT trade consequences were reviewed by a working party rather than a
panel.
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article XXIII:2. 13Importantly, the Understanding expressly provides for panels
composed of three or five members ("depending on the case") selected by the
parties to the dispute and the Director-General of the GATT. It prohibits
representatives of any government that is a party to the dispute from serving as
panelists, and calls for the prompt selection of panelists, "normally" within
thirty days of the GATT Council's decision to establish a panel. 14 To try to meet
this thirty-day target, the parties to the dispute are obliged to respond to
nominations of panel members within seven working days and are prohibited
5
from opposing nominations "except for compelling reasons."'
The Understanding states a preference to use as panelists representatives of
governments, 16 who are required to serve as panelists in their individual capacities
and not as government representatives. 17 Nevertheless, the Understanding also
requires the Director-General to maintain an informal list of governmental and
nongovernmental persons qualified to serve as panelists. The list is intended to
facilitate the expeditious constitution of panels and is revised annually to include
8
one or two names suggested by each Contracting Party. 1
Any Contracting Party with a substantial interest in the matter may notify the
GATT Council of its interest and be heard by the panel. Each panel has the right
to seek information and technical advice from any "appropriate" individual or
body and is prohibited from revealing confidential information without the
9
formal authorization of the party providing it. 1
The panel is charged to make "an objective assessment of the matter before it,
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of
and conformity with the General Agreement. ' 20 Panels "should aim" to issue
their reports "without undue delay"; in cases of urgency, this normally means
three months from the establishment of the panel. 2'
The panel must first submit the descriptive part of its report to the parties to
the dispute, in order to provide one last opportunity for a mutually satisfactory
settlement of the matter. 22 Absent a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel
23
submits its written findings and recommendations, including the rationale.

13. GATT Doc. L/4907, supra note 7, para. 10. However, paragraph 10 does not bestow an
absolute right toa panel, which was granted much later in the Midterm Review of the Uruguay
Round multilateral trade negotiations. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
14. Id.para. 11.
15. Id. para. 12.
16. Id.para. II.
17. Id.para. 14. Governments are prohibited from giving instructions to their officials, when
serving as GATT panelists, regarding the panel process or outcome.
18. Id.para. 13.
19. Id.para. 15.
20. Id.para. 16.
21. Id. para. 20.
22. Id.para. 18.
23. Id.para. 17.
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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Contracting Parties must give panel reports prompt consideration and take
"appropriate action" within a "reasonable period of time." 24 Additionally, the
Parties must keep under surveillance any matter on which they have made a
recommendation or given a ruling. If such recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the party that brought the case may
ask the Contracting Parties
to "make suitable efforts with a view to finding an
25
appropriate solution.'
Thus, the GATT approach in articles XX and XXIII provides first for
consultations between the interested parties. If those consultations fail to settle
the dispute, the complaining party may request the GATT Council to establish a
panel. If the Council does so and the panel is established, the interested parties
argue their cases to an independent panel of experts who make findings and
recommendations to the GATT Council. The GATT Council then decides
whether to adopt and approve the panel report.
One veteran observed that the GATT dispute settlement procedures provide
"no magic formula" for success in resolving trade policy problems, but rather
facilitate "modest progress. ' 2 6 Such progress, however, can be stymied at
various stages of the proceedings. Consultations can be prolonged by an
interested party, and likewise a single party can delay the establishment of a
panel by opposing the establishment in the GATT Council. In controversial
cases, the constitution of a panel can be significantly delayed, and in extraordinary cases, panel proceedings can be put off due to the death or disability of a
member. 27
Even when all the procedures are completed, a single Contracting Party,
including an interested party to whom the panel report is adverse, can block the
GATT Council's adoption of the panel report indefinitely. 28 Finally, there is no
right of appeal of an adverse panel report.
II. Midterm Review Agreement and Continuing Negotiations
In light of these shortcomings, the current round of multilateral trade
negotiations, launched in the fall of 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, includes
a negotiating group on dispute settlement. At the Midterm Review 29 in
December 1988 in Montreal, Canada, Contracting Parties agreed on a number of
improvements to the dispute settlement rules and procedures. In a follow-up
24. Id. para. 21.
25. Id. para. 22. The Understanding includes an Annex that elaborates on the procedures and
practices of panels.
26. See Plank, supra note 1,at 56.
27. E.g., the EC Citrus case, GATT Doc. No. L/5776 (on file at the GATT).
28. E.g., the U.S. complaint about discriminatory European Community (EC) tariffs on citrus
products.
29. The Midterm Review is so called because it falls at the midpoint in negotiations, two years
after their initiation and two years prior to their scheduled conclusion.
SUMMER 1990
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session in Geneva in April 1989,30 the Contracting Parties approved these
changes and agreed to apply them on a trial basis from May 1, 1989, to the end
of the Uruguay Round. 3'
First, the new rules specify a fifteen-month timetable for the conclusion of
panel procedures. Panels must enter into article XXIII: I consultations within ten
days of request, and complete them within sixty days (thirty days in urgent cases,
such as those involving perishable products). A panel must be established no
later than the second GATT Council following the appearance on the Council
agenda of a request for establishment. The panel must use standard terms of
reference unless all interested parties agree on other terms. If agreement on
panelists is not achieved within twenty days, either party to the dispute may ask
the Director-General of the GATT to select the remaining panelists within ten
days. The new rules do not state a preference for governmental representatives,
as the Understanding did. 32
Whenever feasible, multiple complaints about the same matter should be heard
by a single panel. Normally, the complaining party or parties shall submit its
written views first, followed by the first submission of the responding party.
Thereafter written submissions may be submitted simultaneously.
As a rule, the panel shall complete its examination and issue its report to the
parties within six months after the agreement on panelists and terms of reference.
In urgent cases, however, the panel shall aim to provide its report within three
months. The report should never be submitted later than nine months.
The GATT Council may not consider a panel report for adoption until thirty
days after it has been issued to the parties to the dispute. Any party objecting to
such adoption must state its reasons in writing for circulation at least ten days
prior to the Council meeting at which the report will be considered. However,
' 33
"[t]he practice of adopting panel reports by consensus shall be continued.
While the Midterm Review rules and procedures include significant improvements, some important issues remain for further negotiation in 1990. First, the
issue of adoption of panel reports remains controversial. Should the parties to the
dispute alone be able to block adoption of a panel report favored by the other,
30. Although Contracting Parties reached broad agreement in all other areas, they were unable
at the Midterm Review to resolve differences in four areas: agriculture, intellectual property
protection, textiles, and safeguards. Trade Negotiations Committee, Trade Negotiations Committee
Meeting at Ministerial Level: Montreal, December 1988, Doc. No. MTN.TNC/7 (Min.) (Dec. 9,
1988) (on file at the GATT, Geneva). The negotiations were therefore continued the following April.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, GATT Uruguay Round Mid-Term Agreements Achieved
(Apr. 8, 1989) (on file at USTR).
31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement
Rules and Procedures:Decision of 12 April 1989, Doc. No. L/6489 (Apr. 13, 1989).
32. Id. But see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 31. At the Midterm Review, the
United States urged a "consensus minus two" proposal, under which the two parties to the dispute
would be unable alone to block adoption of a panel report. This proposal was rejected in favor of the
long-standing requirement for consensus, enabling a party to the dispute alone to block adoption.
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disinterested Contracting Parties? Second, should there be some avenue of
appeal, whether of right or discretionary, or at least an opportunity for an
extraordinary challenge? Third, should there be additional safeguards regarding
the selection of panelists? Fourth, what procedures should be adopted to review
the implementation of panel reports, or to authorize retaliation in response to
nonimplementation?
The negotiations are scheduled to conclude at a final negotiating session in
Brussels in November-December 1990.
III. Recent Significant GATT Panel Decisions
As if to illustrate the importance of the Uruguay Round dispute settlement
negotiations, recent GATT panel activity has increased dramatically. The clear
trend is toward trade liberalization, with nations that complain about others'
practices winning most of the time. While far from exhaustive, the following
discussion highlights some of the more controversial cases.

A.

U.S.

COMPLAINT ABOUT

EC

OILSEED PRACTICES

In December 1987 the American Soybean Association (ASA) filed a petition
with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (the Act).3 4 ASA complained that the EC
provides subsidies for the production of oilseeds and related animal feed
proteins, and for the processing of oilseeds. ASA alleged that these and other
practices were inconsistent with and denied rights of the United States under the
GATT, and were unjustifiable, unreasonable, burdensome and unduly restrictive
of U.S. commerce.
As required by the Act,35 the United States resorted to the dispute settlement
proceedings of the GATT, and requested consultations under article XXIII: 1.
Despite repeated consultations, the parties were unable to achieve a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the dispute. The United States then requested the
establishment of a panel under article XXIII:2. At the GATT Council of
May 4-5, 1988, the EC refused to authorize the formation of a panel, and even
when the EC did agree to form a panel (at the June 15-16, 1988, GATT Council
session), it took many months to reach agreement on the particular panelists and
the terms of reference. 36

34. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Act]. The term
"section 301" often refers broadly to the trade remedy provided at §§ 301-309, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2411-2419.
35. Act § 303(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (1989).
36. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Report to Congress on Section 301 Developments
Required by Section 309(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (January-June 1989) 7-8 (undated) (on file at
USTR) [hereinafter Semi-Annual Report on Section 301 Developments].
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This case illustrates some past perils of GATT dispute settlement; it was rife
with delays in politically sensitive or commercially substantial cases. Yet it also
symbolizes the promise of GATT dispute settlement-the United States finally
obtained a favorable GATT panel report in December 1989. 37 While the United
States has not received compensation from the EC or exported one ton more of
soybeans to the EC, 38 this legal victory deals U.S. trade officials several aces in
a card game with the EC, and it enables U.S. negotiators to leap over years of
otherwise protracted debate.
The case also symbolizes the potentially enormous reach of the GATT, which
makes actionable not only violation of its letter, but also activity that is
inconsistent with its spirit. Even though the EC domestic subsidies were not
"GATT-illegal," they nullified or impaired a benefit reasonably expected to
accrue to the United States after the EC's tariff concessions on soybeans in the
Kennedy Round.
B.

U.S. COMPLAINT ABOUT JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

Another major victory for trade liberalization was achieved in the "GATT12" case, in which the United States complained of Japanese import restrictions
on twelve agricultural products. 39 While the value of trade in these items was not
earthshaking, the practices challenged were quotas that the United States
considered inconsistent with article XI of the GATT (which generally prohibits
the use of quotas). Significantly, Japan restricted imports of higher value beef
and citrus on the basis of the same GATT arguments as applied to the GATT-12
products. Presumably, the outcome of the U.S. challenge to the twelve
agricultural quotas presumably would presage the outcome of any GATT
challenge to the beef and citrus quotas as well.
In February 1988, after three rounds of argument and seven rounds of written
submissions, the panel reached a decision. On both the major issues-(1)
whether the Japanese practices were authorized by an exception to article XI's
general prohibition of quotas; and (2) whether Japan's use of state trading
37. Id. at 8. The panel ruled that the EC subsidies nullified or impaired the reasonably expected
benefits of the tariff concession made by the EC when it bound its tariff on soybeans at zero.
38. Ambassador Hills reportedly stated her expectation that the EC will implement this panel
report in time for the 1991 soybean planting season. She acknowledged that it probably would not
be feasible for the EC to act accordingly earlier. Daily Reportfor Executives (BNA) A-12 (Dec. 21,
1989).
39. Prepared and preserved milk and cream, processed cheese, dried peas and beans, starch and
inulin, peanuts, prepared and processed beef, nonsucrose sugar and syrups, fruit purees and pastes,
fruit pulp and canned pineapple, noncitrus fruit and vegetable juices, tomato juice, ketchup and
sauce, and other sugar- and dairy-based food preparations. See generally the introduction by the
USTR lawyer who argued and won this case, A. Porges, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Dispute Settlement Reports on JapaneseAgricultural Import Quotasand Japanese-U.S. Exchange of

Letters on Beef and Citrus, 27 I.L.M. 1539 (1988).
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immunized those practices from GATT challenge-the panel ruled in favor of the
United States.
This panel's report's significance is twofold. First, it represents a successful
use of GATT dispute settlement procedures with respect to agricultural practices,
which historically had eluded resolution under article XXIII. Second, by
eliminating a credible GATT defense for the restrictions on imports of beef and
citrus as well, the panel report expedited the market-liberalizing agreement
concluded by the United States and Japan just four months later. 40
C.

U.S. COMPLAINT ABOUT KOREAN BEEF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

The Republic of Korea also limits the amount of beef that may be imported.
Following long-running, unsuccessful consultations with the Korean government, the United States formally requested consultations under article XXIII: 1
and subsequently the establishment of a panel under article XXIII:2. 4 1 Australia
and New Zealand were also interested parties; like the United States, they are
substantial producers and exporters of beef.
As in the GATT-12 case, the issue was whether the GATT quantitative
restrictions were prohibited under article XI of the GATT and not otherwise
authorized by an exception to the GATT. As in the GATT-12 case, the panel
ruled that the Korean beef restrictions were subject to article XI's prohibition on
the use of quantitative restrictions and were not authorized by any exception to
article XI.
Unlike the Japan case, however, the Korea case was complicated by Korea's
claim that article XVIII warranted the restrictions on the basis of Korea's alleged
need to safeguard its external financial position and ensure a level of reserves
adequate for the implementation of its economic development program. The
panel ruled, however, that Korea's import restrictions on beef were not justified
for balance-of-payments purposes, especially in light of improvements in
Korea's balance-of-payments situation. 42 The panel recommended prompt establishment of a timetable for phasing out Korea's restrictions on beef.43 Korea
objected to adoption of the panel report at GATT Council meetings in June, July,

40. 27 I.L.M. 1588 (1988).
41. Like the EC Oilseeds case, Korea Beef was begun in response to the filing of a petition under
section 301 of the Trade Act, in this instance by the American Meat Institute on February 16, 1988.
Semi-Annual Report on Section 301 Developments, supra note 36, at 8.
42. In a separate but related development, the GATT Balance of Payments Committee had
"taken note" of the evolution of Korea's balance-of-payments situation, as well as the statement by
the International Monetary Fund on the strength of Korea's reserves position and the positive results
of its economic policies. In response, Korea agreed to disinvoke article XVIII:B by January 1, 1990,
and to phase out by 1997 all its import restrictions "or otherwise bring them into conformity" with
the GATT. Inside U.S. Trade 6 (Nov. 3, 1989).
43. Semi-Annual Report on Section 301 Developments, supra note 36, at 9.
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and October 1989, 44 but at the November GATT Council meeting agreed to
permit the report to be adopted. 45
The significance of the Korea beef case is the consolidation of the trend toward
trade liberalization, even in the controversial area of agricultural trade, in a
developing country that until now has restricted imports based on balance-ofpayments grounds.
D.

U.S. COMPLAINT ABOUT CANADIAN ICE CREAM AND YOGURT RESTRICTIONS

In 1988, the United States requested consultations with Canada under article
XXIII: I about its quantitative restrictions on imports of ice cream and yogurt. In
the absence of a satisfactory resolution, in December 1988, the United States
requested the establishment of a panel under article XXIII:2. As in other cases
of import quotas, the United States argued that such measures were contrary to
article XI's general prohibition on import quotas and not justified by any of the
exceptions provided therein.
In the fall of 1989, a panel ruled for the United States and found that the
Canadian restrictions were inconsistent with article XI. To date, Canada has
blocked adoption of the panel report, with which it has said it has major
difficulties. 4 6 Like the previous article XI cases, this case consolidates the
trade-liberalizing trend in GATT dispute settlement, even in the controversial
agricultural arena.
While the above-described cases are notable victories for the United States in
GATT dispute settlement, the United States has suffered some notable losses as
well. We now examine other trade-liberalizing GATT panel decisions, in which
the United States unsuccessfully attempted to justify its practices.
E.

EC

COMPLAINT ABOUT U.S. SECTION

337

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (Tariff Act),4 7 broadly
authorizes relief for U.S. industries against unfair methods of competition with
respect to imports into the United States. The principal application of section 337
has been to protect U.S. intellectual property right owners from imports that
infringe those rights, including product and process patents, copyrights, and
trademarks. 48 Section 337 relief is available solely with respect to imports. By

44. Id. at 8.
45. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA) A-12 (Nov. 8, 1989).
46. E.g., Canada blocked adoption of the panel report at the November 7 GAIT Council. Daily
Report for Executives (BNA) A- 1l, A-12 (Nov. 8, 1989).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
48. Simplistically, a complaining U.S. person petitions the U.S. International Trade Commission to provide relief (as through an exclusion order or cease and desist order) against infringing
imports. The case is heard by an administrative law judge, who makes an initial determination subject
to review by the Commission.
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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contrast, relief under the core intellectual property laws of title 35 of the United
States Code is available with respect to both imports and domestic goods and
parties.
For some time section 337 has provoked opposition by foreign governments
that complain of an alleged lack of national treatment. Years ago, Canada sought
to obtain a panel under article XXIII:2 and complained of the section 337 order
issued by the Commission against spring assemblies. 49 The United States
successfully defended its use of section 337 on the basis of the broad exception
in article XX(d) for "measures . . . necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement,
including those relating to . . . the protection of patents,
trademarks and
5
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices." 0
However, the Spring Assembly decision did not deter the EC in 1987 from
requiring consultations under article XXIII: 1, and the establishment of a panel
under article XXIII:2. The EC contested section 337 in general as well as its
application in the Aramid Fiber case. 5' In Aramid Fiber,the Commission issued
an order, which the President permitted to take effect without acting, 52 that
excluded imports produced by a Dutch company, Akzo, that were found to
infringe a valid patent held by E.I. DuPont de Nemours. The Dutch company
sought to include several counterclaims in the section 337 proceeding, but that
provision does not permit counterclaims. Akzo then sued in U.S. district court
53
and lost.
Nonetheless, the EC argued, and the panel found, that section 337 denies the
national treatment that article III of the GATT provides to products of the
territory of GATT contracting parties with respect to all laws, regulations, and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, and use. While the panel report noted differences between
the provisions of U.S. patent law and section 337, it held that any differences
between those two that resulted in less favorable treatment of imports violated
article Ill-even if other differences treated domestic products less favorably
than imports. 54 The panel thus failed to judge whether the differences between
the two regimes as a whole constitute a denial of national treatment.
The panel further rejected the United States' arguments that section 337 was
justified under article XX(d) as necessary to secure compliance with laws to

49. In re Spring Assemblies and Components Thereof; and Methodfor Their Manufacture, Inv.
No. 337-TA-88 (USTIC Pub. 1172) (Aug. 1981).
50. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d).
51. In re A CertainAramid Fiber, Inv. No. 337-TA-194 (USTIC Pub. 1824) (Mar. 1986).
52. The Commission's decision is subject to review by the President, who may approve it,
disapprove it, or let it take effect without his action. Tariff Act, § 1337(j), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j).
53. Akzo N.V. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 635 F. Supp. 1336 (E.D. Va. 1986).
54. E.g., the absence of substantial in rem relief in title 35 cases, and the greater difficulty of
obtaining in personam jurisdiction.
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protect patents. The panel ruled that the availability of alternative means of
protecting patents-proceedings in U.S. district courts under Title 35 of the
United States Code-prevents section 337 from being considered as "necessary" to secure compliance with intellectual property laws.
The United States blocked the adoption of this panel report by the GATT
Council seven times. 55 Subject to unprecedented pressure in Geneva, and at an
important juncture in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States finally
ceased its resistance at the GATT Council meeting on November 7, 1989.56
However, in so doing, the Trade Representative stressed that the United States
did not approve the panel report. "Although we did not block GATT Council
adoption of the panel report on Section 337, the United States did not join that
consensus or accept the report's findings." 57 Moreover, while the Trade
Representative agreed to seek to conform her practices in this regard with the
GATT panel report, she nonetheless emphasized that implementation of any such
solution would be part of the overall implementation of any agreements
concluded in the Uruguay Round. In addition, any such solution would "need to
reflect [the United States'] commitment to strong enforcement of intellectual
property rights." 58 Finally, the White House issued an extraordinary press
release stating that the GATT panel report "should not provide a basis for
changing current practice
with respect to Presidential review or for disapproving
' 59
section 337 orders.
This case, like prior blocking cases (more often than not involving agriculture
and the European Community's opposition to adoption6 0 ), illustrates the longstanding limitations on GATT dispute settlement. The procedures allow a single
interested party to block the adoption of a panel report. Many observers believe
this shortcoming ultimately stems from the political, rather than judicial, nature
of dispute settlement in an international forum of sovereign nations. To date,
55. Ironically, in the dispute settlement negotiations in the Midterm Review in December 1988
in Montreal, the United States promoted adoption of a "consensus minus two" approach, under
which opposition by parties to the dispute alone could not prevent adoption of a panel report.
However, other Contracting Parties rejected the United States approach. In blocking adoption of the
section 337 report, then, the U.S. simply exercised its right to block-which it had been fully
prepared to relinquish, but which other Contracting Parties insisted on retaining.
56. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Hills Announces GATT Council's
Adoption of Panel Report on Section 337 (Nov. 7, 1989) (on file at USTR).
57. Id. at 2. Intellectual property protection in general, and section 337 in particular, feature
prominently in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, through the inclusion of broad
trade negotiating objectives on intellectual property rights, so-called "Special 301," and amendments to section 337 designed to make it a "more effective" and more broadly applicable remedy.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, §§ 1101(b)(10), 1303, 1342, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1123-24, 1179-81, 1212-16 (1988).
58. Daily Report Jbr Executives (BNA) A- 1l,
A-12 (Nov. 8, 1989) (quoting Ambassador Rufus
Yerxa).
59. Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative Enforcement of Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1699 (Nov. 7, 1989).
60. E.g., the EC Citrus case, supra note 27.
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GATT Contracting Parties have elected to tolerate the frustration of dispute.
settlement through blocking rather than lose the safety valve that blocking
creates. Currently a Contracting Party may not be legally compelled to permit a
panel report to be adopted. Nevertheless, the section 337 case reflects the
potency of political pressures as a means through which beneficiaries of dispute
settlement may achieve the adoption of favorable reports over opposition by the
"losing" party.
F.

CANADIAN,

EC,

AND MEXICAN COMPLAINTS ABOUT U.S. SUPERFUND

Another case in which the United States was a respondent rather than a
complainant involved the 1986 legislation enacted to fund the Superfund cleanup
program. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 6 1 established an
11.7 cents per barrel fee on imported petroleum as compared to 8.2 cents per
barrel for domestically produced petroleum. With respect to certain imported
chemicals, the legislation established taxes on downstream chemicals equivalent
to the tax the chemicals would have borne had their inputs been sold in the United
States.
Canada, the EC, and Mexico objected to the fees and requested consultations
almost immediately after the enactment of the legislation. The failure to resolve
this matter led to the establishment of a panel under article XXIII:2.
The complainants charged that the 3.5-cent differential in taxes denied the
national treatment with respect to internal charges as provided by article 111:2 and
nullified or impaired GATT benefits. The United States replied that the
differential was so small that it caused no trade damage and did not impair GATT
benefits. However, the panel ruled that a per se violation of the GATT warranted
an irrebuttable presumption of trade damage. It therefore ruled on behalf of the
US obtained a favorable ruling with respect to the
complaining parties. 62 The U.S.
fees imposed on refined products. The panel straightforwardly applied GATT law
and practice and ruled that this was a GATT-consistent border tax adjustment. 63
The GATT Council adopted the Superfund panel report on June 17, 1987.
After a long delay, the United States enacted legislation to enter into compliance
with the panel report in November 1 9 89 . 64
The Superfund case underscores the need for the Administration in some
instances to obtain legislation in order to conform with an adverse GATT panel
report. In limited cases the President is authorized to provide compensation in

61. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
62. See General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Superfund Excise Taxes, Introductory Note, 27 1.L.M. 1596 (1988).
63. Id.
64. Conformity was accomplished through the enactment of the Steel Trade Liberalization
Program Implementation Act, § 8, 135 CONG. REC. H9704 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989).
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the event of adverse GATT action. 65 When Congress enacts legislation later
challenged and found to be GATT-inconsistent, however, such compensation is
not generally provided.
G.

AUSTRALIAN COMPLAINT ABOUT U.S. SUGAR IMPORT QUOTAS

In September 1988, Australia requested consultations with the United States
concerning certain import quotas on sugar. 66 Absent a mutually satisfactory
resolution through such consultations, Australia requested and obtained the
establishment of a GATT panel. Australia maintained that as administered the
quotas were inconsistent with article XI and not justified by any exception
allowed by article XI. In response, the United States maintained that its import
quota was permissible as part of its tariff schedules which are incorporated into
and recognized by the GATT. The panel found the quota was in contravention of
the GATT because import restrictions are permitted only according to narrow
exceptions specified in article XI, which the U.S. program did not satisfy.
On June 22, 1989, the GATT Council adopted the report. In her statement
commenting on this action and the United States' acceptance of this report, the
Trade Representative characterized the panel's finding as focused solely on the
U.S. administration of the quota system, rather than the quotas themselves.
Ambassador Hills noted that the Administration would consider its options on
how to bring such administration into conformity
with the GATT in close
67
consultation with the industry and Congress.
In explaining the United States' prompt decision to accept this adverse panel
report, Ambassador Hills stressed that "all members of the GATT have an
interest in an effective dispute settlement process for agricultural products, as
well as other goods. It's to our benefit to have a system that works and can deal
' 68
effectively with agricultural trade disputes.
IV. Conclusion
Burgeoning GATT practice and continuing GATT negotiations regarding
dispute settlement offer great promise to all those committed to the rule of law.
65. E.g., Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, § 1378, 19 U.S.C. § 3107; Trade Act of
1974, § 123, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2133 (1988).
66. This complaint related exclusively to quotas imposed under the authority of Headnote 3 to
the former Tariff Schedules of the United States. United States sugar quotas imposed under
section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act are being challenged separately by the EC in the
GATT.
67. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement by Ambassador Hills on GATT Sugar
Panel (June 22, 1989) (on file at USTR). Ambassador Hills also stressed that the quota dealt with by
the panel report is separate and unrelated to Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations. She noted that
these negotiations are aimed at substantially reducing all trade-distorting policies regarding all
agricultural commodities, including sugar. However, she emphasized that the United States would
not "unilaterally eliminate support for U.S. sugar producers."
68. Id.
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Rules lose their value unless a means for resolving disputes about their
application can be expeditiously applied and reliably enforced.
The current trend in the GATT is clearly toward more effective enforcement of
existing rules. Likewise, the direction of ongoing negotiations is toward the
improvement of dispute settlement procedures where they have to date proved
deficient. Such developments are likely to strengthen the GATT's position
significantly for the remainder of this decade and into the next century.
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